William2333ZZ

crossval-harness

Orchestrate a static + dynamic, exploit-validated red-team of an AI agent — read the source to find candidate vulnerable paths, then run the dynamic skills to confirm or refute each one empirically. The arbiter of truth is whether the exploit works, not a model vote. Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

redteam-an-agent

The end-to-end methodology for red-teaming a specific AI agent — adaptively, exploit-validated, and honestly. Read THIS target's own code, stand up a disposable harness, and prove or refute each weakness through a real attacker-reachable entry point. This is the orchestration + discipline that makes a finding credible, not a list of payloads. Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt4-action-gating

Red-team an AI agent's high-risk action gating — can a costly or destructive action (pay, message, delete) reach execution without out-of-band human confirmation, especially under auto-approve/unattended modes? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt6-memory-poisoning

Red-team an AI agent's persistent memory for cross-session prompt injection ("memory poisoning") — does untrusted content the agent processes get written into long-term memory and re-fire in future sessions with no attacker present? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt7-supply-chain

Red-team an AI agent's skill / plugin / MCP supply chain — can a poisoned skill doc, a malicious MCP server, or a dependency-confused package become persistent executable instruction? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt9-multi-agent

Red-team a multi-agent system — can one agent (or content it relays) inject instructions into another, escalate privilege by hopping between agents, or turn an orchestrator/sub-agent handoff into a trust-laundering path? Authorized testing of systems you own or are permitted to test.

rt1-prompt-injection

Red-team an AI agent for prompt injection — does content the agent is asked to process (email, page, ticket, tool result) override its actual task? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt2-tool-abuse

Red-team an AI agent's tools — can it be coerced (often via injection) into calling a tool it shouldn't, with attacker-influenced arguments, or into acting as a confused deputy with its own privileges? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt3-sandbox-escape

Red-team an AI agent's tool-execution isolation — do tools run un-sandboxed on the host, and does the sandbox silently disable itself when a dependency is missing? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt5-channel-injection

Red-team the channels an AI agent listens on (Telegram/Discord/Slack/WhatsApp/email/webhooks) — can untrusted inbound content, including group messages and forwards, steer the agent? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.

rt8-data-exfiltration

Red-team an AI agent for data exfiltration — can an injection coax secrets, credentials, or sensitive data out of the agent through a tool call, a URL, or an outbound message? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.