coercion-ntlm-relay

Solid

Authentication coercion (PetitPotam MS-EFSR, PrinterBug MS-RPRN, DFSCoerce MS-DFSNM) chained into NTLM relay (impacket ntlmrelayx) toward LDAP, AD CS web enrollment (ESC8), or SMB. Use when SMB signing is not enforced or LDAP channel binding is missing, and you want to force a privileged machine account to authenticate to your relay and turn that into RBCD, a DCSync-capable ACL grant, or a certificate. Includes the exact Coercer/ntlmrelayx commands, requirements, detection, and remediation.

DevOps & Infrastructure 194 stars 31 forks Updated 2 weeks ago MIT

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Skill Content

# Coercion + NTLM Relay Two techniques that combine into one of the most reliable domain-compromise chains: **force** a target (usually a Domain Controller's machine account) to authenticate to a host you control, then **relay** that authentication to a service that lacks the protection to reject it. No credential cracking involved; you are borrowing a live authentication. The chain only works when a relay target is unprotected: - **Relay to LDAP/LDAPS** requires **LDAP signing not enforced** and **channel binding (EPA) absent**. - **Relay to SMB** requires **SMB signing not enforced** on the destination. - **Relay to AD CS web enrollment (ESC8)** requires the HTTP enrollment endpoint up **without EPA**. Check signing posture first: ``` nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt # hosts without SMB signing nxc ldap 10.0.0.10 -u user -p 'Password123' -M ldap-checker # LDAP signing / channel binding state ``` --- ## Part 1: Coercion You need a way to make a privileged account authenticate outbound to your IP. Three RPC-based coercion methods, each abusing a different protocol. All fire the target's **machine account** ($) authentication at you. ### PetitPotam: MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote) **MITRE ATT&CK:** T1187 (Forced Authentication) Abuses the EFSRPC interface (`EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` and related). Often works unauthenticated against unpatched DCs; authenticated on patched ones. ``` Coercer coerce -u user -p 'Password123' -d CORP.LOCAL \ ...

Details

Author
ADScanPro
Repository
ADScanPro/Claude-AD
Created
2 weeks ago
Last Updated
2 weeks ago
Language
N/A
License
MIT

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