offensive-dependency-confusion

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Deep-dive offensive methodology for dependency confusion and namespace attacks across all major package ecosystems. Covers npm scope confusion exploiting the gap between public and private scoped packages and .npmrc misconfigurations where registry mappings fail to pin internal scopes exclusively. Addresses PyPI namespace attacks through --extra-index-url resolution ordering, NuGet feed priority exploitation when multiple package sources are configured without clear directives, Maven and Gradle repository ordering where artifact resolution traverses repositories sequentially, Go module proxy abuse through GOPROXY misconfiguration, Ruby gems namespace squatting, and Docker image tag confusion with unqualified image references. Provides complete proof-of-concept methodology using safe callbacks including DNS canary via interactsh or Burp Collaborator and HTTP beacon with no destructive payload. Covers reconnaissance techniques for discovering internal package names through GitHub repository analysis, error mess

AI & Automation 3,234 stars 523 forks Updated 1 weeks ago MIT

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Skill Content

# Offensive Dependency Confusion and Namespace Attacks Dependency confusion exploits a fundamental design tension in package managers: the need to resolve packages from multiple sources. When an organization maintains internal packages alongside public dependencies, the resolution logic becomes an attack surface. You exploit the gap between how developers intend packages to resolve and how package managers actually resolve them. Alex Birsan's 2021 research demonstrated that this class of attack affected Apple, Microsoft, PayPal, Shopify, Netflix, Yelp, Tesla, and Uber, among others. The root cause -- preferring a higher-versioned public package over a lower-versioned private one -- remains exploitable wherever registry configuration is incomplete. This skill provides ecosystem-specific exploitation techniques, safe PoC methodology, and comprehensive reconnaissance approaches for discovering internal package names during authorized engagements. ## Quick Workflow 1. Perform reconnaissance to discover internal/private package names used by the target. 2. Identify the target's package ecosystems and registry configuration. 3. Verify that candidate package names are unclaimed on the corresponding public registry. 4. Prepare a safe PoC package with a DNS canary or HTTP callback and a high version number. 5. Publish the PoC to the public registry with a clear security research description. 6. Monitor the callback endpoint for execution confirmations from target infrastructure. ...

Details

Author
SnailSploit
Repository
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Created
6 months ago
Last Updated
1 weeks ago
Language
Python
License
MIT

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