adjudicating-taint-paths

# Adjudicating taint paths: lead → decided finding A lead is a *fact* about structure - "an input-shaped value can reach a dangerous sink." It is never a verdict. Adjudication is the disciplined work of deciding whether that structural possibility is a real, reachable bug on the current source, and recording the decision so it isn't re-litigated next pass. ## When to use - A scanner or candidate list flagged a sink and you must confirm or kill it. - You spotted a sink by hand and want to know if attacker input reaches it. - You need to *kill* a plausible-looking lead with evidence, not vibes. ## Scope check Authorized source only (your own, OSS, CTF, in-scope engagement). If you can't name the authorization, stop. ## The loop 1. **Name source and sink precisely.** Which exact argument of which sink is dangerous, and what is the *actual* untrusted entry - a request param, header, filename, env var, deserialized field? Vague framing ("user input reaches it somewhere") is how false positives survive. 2. **Trace the reverse cone into the sink.** What values can flow *into* this sink argument? This enumerates every origin. If none trace back to an untrusted source, the lead is dead - kill it, record why. 3. **Trace the forward cone from the source.** Where does the untrusted value go? If it never touches the sink, the lead is dead. Forward and reverse must agree; if they don't, you mis-specified an endpoint - fix it and redo. 4. **Get a witness path....