auditing-skill-and-mcp-instructions
SolidLint the natural-language instruction text of an agent skill or MCP server, not its code: the skill body, the frontmatter description, tool descriptions, and parameter text a model reads and obeys. Covers instructions hidden in comments or markup, invisible and look-alike Unicode, override phrases that countermand earlier instructions, concealment directives that tell the agent to hide an action from the user, and instructions that steer the agent to read secrets and send them out. Use when reviewing a skill, an MCP server, or a marketplace entry before trusting it, or auditing what instruction text enters an agent's context. Every word the model reads is instruction surface; a planted instruction is the finding.
Install
Quality Score: 80/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- UnboundCompute
- Repository
- UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
- Created
- 5 days ago
- Last Updated
- yesterday
- Language
- N/A
- License
- MIT
Integrates with
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
agent-skill-auditor
Statically audit any Agent Skill, MCP server config, or rules file (CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, AGENTS.md) with the `uncloak` scanner BEFORE installing, enabling, or trusting it — catches invisible-Unicode instruction smuggling, MCP tool-description poisoning, credential/exfil paths, and lethal-trifecta posture. Use whenever you are about to add, copy, or fetch a third-party agent extension.
auditing-mcp-tool-integrations
Red-team the tool layer of an AI agent: the tool definitions, metadata, and outputs that a model reads and trusts. Covers tool poisoning (instructions hidden in a tool's description), tool shadowing and name collisions, rug-pulls (definitions that change after approval), line jumping (metadata acting before any call), token and credential passthrough, and tool-output injection. Use when adding or reviewing a tool, an MCP server, or a tool-marketplace entry, or when auditing an agent's tool manifest. The model reads every tool description as input; treat all of it as untrusted instruction surface.
context-audit
Audit the instructions an agent already carries — CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, skills, tool descriptions — for contradictions, over-constraint, and duplication, then propose a cut list. Use when an agent ignores its own instructions, when a CLAUDE.md has grown bloated, or when the user asks to audit or rightsize their agent context.