hunting-non-human-identity-and-secret-reachability
SolidHunt machine credentials that are live, over-privileged, and actually reachable, not just present. Covers non-human identities and secrets across code, configuration, and infrastructure definitions: API keys, service-account credentials, and long-lived tokens. Separates a secret that merely exists from one an attacker can reach and use, and adjudicates each by whether it is still valid, how much it grants, and whether an untrusted path leads to it. Use when reviewing secret exposure, machine identities, or the blast radius of a leaked credential, and when a scanner reports many secrets and you need to know which ones matter. A reachable, live, over-privileged credential is the finding.
Install
Quality Score: 80/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- UnboundCompute
- Repository
- UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
- Created
- 5 days ago
- Last Updated
- yesterday
- Language
- N/A
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
secret-detection
Keeping credentials out of source, and what to do once one is in: rotate before removing, because deleting the line does not un-leak it. Covers where a secret may live, safe .env templates, why a client-reachable config value is public, and running a scanner rather than eyeballing for patterns. Use when writing code that reads a credential, creating config or .env templates, before committing, or after discovering a secret in a repository.
hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths
Hunt privilege-escalation paths in cloud identity and access management: a low-privileged principal that chains role assumptions, policy rewrites, role-passing, and over-broad trust relationships to reach an administrative or data-access principal. Covers the identity-to-permission-to-resource graph, the known escalation primitives (passing a more privileged role to a service, rewriting a policy to a permissive version, assuming a role whose trust condition is too loose), and the boundary controls that should stop the chain. Use when reviewing cloud IAM, role and policy configuration, or an identity graph. A reachable path from an untrusted principal to admin is the finding.
hunting-supply-chain-risks
Hunt for the ways an attacker gets code into your build without touching your repo: dependency confusion (a public package shadowing an internal name), typosquatting and slopsquatting (a package named after a model's hallucination), poisoned pipeline execution (untrusted input running as a build step), and over-privileged or injectable CI. Use when reviewing a build pipeline, a dependency manifest, an internal package registry, or a CI/CD configuration. The app code can be clean while the artifact you ship is not.