testing-agents-for-indirect-prompt-injection
SolidTest whether an AI agent obeys instructions hidden in the content it ingests, rather than only the user's. Enumerate every channel through which untrusted content reaches the model context (retrieved docs, fetched pages, uploaded files, emails, tool outputs, filenames, images and PDFs, other agents), plant channel-appropriate payloads, and measure whether they change the agent's actions. Use when reviewing any agent or LLM app that reads external content and can act. Covers channel enumeration, overt and covert payloads, canary observables, and impact via the trifecta.
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Quality Score: 80/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- UnboundCompute
- Repository
- UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
- Created
- 5 days ago
- Last Updated
- yesterday
- Language
- N/A
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
rt1-prompt-injection
Red-team an AI agent for prompt injection — does content the agent is asked to process (email, page, ticket, tool result) override its actual task? Authorized testing of agents you own or are permitted to test.
prompt-injection
Expert methodology for testing direct and indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities in LLM-powered applications, agents, and pipelines. Covers payload construction, context manipulation, cross-agent propagation, and exfiltration triggers.
defending-against-prompt-injection
Keep an agent from obeying instructions hidden in the content it reads. Covers placing fetched pages, emails, and API responses in tool_result blocks instead of the system prompt; wrapping that content as JSON with explicit source fields; labeling its provenance; screening tool output with a fast classifier before the agent acts; and stating an untrusted-content policy in the system prompt. Use this when someone builds an agent that reads the web, email, shared files, or any third-party text, asks how to stop indirect or cross-content prompt injection, or finds an agent following instructions buried in a fetched page. Trigger on "indirect prompt injection," "agent followed instructions in a web page," "untrusted tool output," and similar. This is content handling inside the context window; limiting the damage once an attack lands is environment containment (sandboxing-agentic-systems), and gating outbound commands is action gating.