testing-llm-insecure-output-handling
SolidTest what happens after the model speaks: whether an application trusts model output and passes it, unescaped, into a browser, a terminal, a shell, a database, or another system. Covers model-driven XSS and markup injection, data exfiltration through rendered markdown images and links, terminal and ANSI escape injection, invisible-unicode and ascii smuggling in output, and output used to build code, SQL, or shell commands. Use when reviewing any app that renders, executes, or forwards LLM output. The model's output is an untrusted string.
Install
Quality Score: 80/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- UnboundCompute
- Repository
- UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
- Created
- 5 days ago
- Last Updated
- yesterday
- Language
- N/A
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
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