testing-request-smuggling
SolidTest whether a chain of HTTP servers disagrees about where one request ends and the next begins, letting an attacker smuggle a request past the front end into the back end. Covers front-end and back-end desync from conflicting length signals, connection-reuse poisoning, single-packet and timing detection, and adjacent boundary confusion where a proxy and origin parse framing differently. Use when reviewing a reverse proxy, load balancer, CDN, or any multi-hop HTTP path where two parsers sit in series. The bug is a disagreement between parsers, not one flaw.
Install
Quality Score: 80/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- UnboundCompute
- Repository
- UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
- Created
- 5 days ago
- Last Updated
- yesterday
- Language
- N/A
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
hunt-http-smuggling
Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass.
testing-smtp-smuggling-and-email-spoofing
Test a mail setup for sender spoofing that survives authentication: SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records that exist but do not align or enforce, subdomains left unprotected, and the end-of-data desync known as SMTP smuggling, where an inbound and an outbound mail server disagree on where one message ends so a second message with a forged, auth-passing sender is smuggled in. Covers policy present but not enforced, alignment gaps between the envelope and header sender, missing subdomain policy, open relay, and inconsistent message-boundary parsing between hops. Use when auditing a domain's mail authentication or a mail server's boundary handling. The crafted or smuggled message is the source, an accepted spoofed delivery is the sink.
testing-web-cache-attacks
Test how a caching layer between users and an application can be turned against it: cache poisoning (getting a harmful response stored and served to other users) and cache deception (tricking the cache into storing a victim's private response where the attacker can read it). Covers finding the cache key and unkeyed inputs, identifying cacheable responses, poisoning through unkeyed headers, and deceiving path-based caching into storing authenticated content. Use when reviewing a CDN, a reverse proxy, or any shared HTTP cache in front of an app.