auditing-uefi-firmware-with-chipsec
SolidUse Intel CHIPSEC to assess platform firmware configuration, SPI flash write protection, BIOS lock, SMM/SMRR, and Secure Boot variable state, dump SPI flash, and triage UEFI variables for firmware-level threats.
Install
Quality Score: 90/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- adriannoes
- Repository
- adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai
- Created
- 9 months ago
- Last Updated
- 2 days ago
- Language
- Jupyter Notebook
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
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analyzing-bootkit-and-rootkit-samples
Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.
secure-boot-cert-rotation
Triage and remediate the Microsoft Secure Boot 2011→2023 UEFI certificate rotation (CAs expiring June/October 2026) across Dell PowerEdge / iDRAC9 bare metal, Ubuntu/Linux servers, and Harvester HCI / KubeVirt guest VMs. Establishes the load-bearing fact that UEFI firmware ignores certificate expiry — nothing stops booting on the deadline; the real risk is forward-compat once a 2023-only-signed shim arrives, plus a dbx/revocation freeze — then routes to the cleanest per-platform fix: iDRAC BIOS-staged keys applied on reboot (Dell), fwupd-free manual `db` append that self-authenticates via the existing 2011 KEK (Linux), and the Harvester virt-launcher OVMF floor (v1.6.0) with ephemeral-vs-persistent NVRAM triage (VMs). Covers the PK→KEK→db trust chain, why no generic Microsoft 2023 KEK payload exists, and audit via mokutil / efi-readvar / racadm bioscert / Redfish.
iot-firmware-security
Metodología de pentest de firmware IoT mapeada a OWASP FSTM (9 etapas), IoT Top 10 2018 (I1-I10) e ISVS (V1-V5) — análisis estático (binwalk, extracción de filesystem, credenciales/backdoors, SBOM), emulación (FirmAE/QEMU) para levantar la UI/servicios sin hardware, inyección de comandos en CGI del dispositivo, explotación de binarios embebidos (MIPS/ARM), y update inseguro (I4). Úsala cuando el activo en scope sea un firmware (asset_type 'iot-firmware'). La usan firmware-recon (estático+emulación) y firmware-exploit (dinámico+binarios). Hardware/radio = operator-assisted.