team-cert-verification
SolidUse when implementing or reviewing AWID team-certificate authentication — verifying the request-bound v2 team-auth envelope, porting folio auth.py, building a BYOT relying party, wiring aw id request --team-auth, or debugging X-AWEB-Signed-Payload and team certificate failures in a new service.
Install
Quality Score: 86/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- awebai
- Repository
- awebai/aweb
- Created
- 7 months ago
- Last Updated
- 5 days ago
- Language
- Go
- License
- MIT
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
byot-e2e-validation
Use when writing e2e tests for BYOT/AWID team-certificate auth, testing aw id request --team-auth, building a docker awid-service harness, or validating replay, revocation, fail-closed, and team-scoping behavior.
aweb-team-membership
This skill should be used when joining or being added to an aweb team, picking the correct invite/add-member path for the team's authority model (hosted vs BYOT), accepting invites, fetching team certificates, switching the active team across multiple memberships, distinguishing hosted from Bring Your Own Team (BYOT) authority, running the fresh BYOT setup into aweb cloud, or diagnosing team-certificate and active-team failures. Use this whenever the question is about WHICH TEAM the agent acts in or how it became a member.
auditing-jwt-verification-trust
Audit code that verifies a JSON Web Token for a signature or claims check that trusts token-supplied parameters, so an attacker can forge a token the server accepts, after the algorithm pinning and the key source are resolved. Covers an algorithm taken from the token header rather than pinned server-side, an RS256-to-HS256 key confusion where a public key is used as an HMAC secret, an accepted none algorithm or a verification call with signature checking off, a kid, jku, or x5u parameter sourcing a key from an untrusted location, audience, issuer, and expiry claims left unchecked, and an HMAC secret that is weak, guessable, or committed. Use when reviewing the verification call and its options in source, not the token-generation entropy the randomness skill owns or the OAuth flow the OIDC skill owns. A token with an attacker-chosen header or bytes is the source, a verification call that gates identity is the sink, and an unpinned algorithm or a token-sourced key is the bug.