cloud-iam-deep

Solid

Cloud IAM red-team attack chain across AWS, Azure, GCP — focused on EXTERNAL exploitation paths and post-credential-discovery privilege analysis. Covers IAM enumeration (aws iam, az role, gcloud iam), STS/AssumeRole chaining, Azure Managed Identity abuse (via SSRF/leak), GCP service account JSON abuse, IMDSv1/v2 attacks via SSRF, K8s ServiceAccount token privilege analysis once held (token discovery / cluster exposure is owned by hunt-k8s), role-trust-policy confused-deputy, cross-account assume-role enumeration, IAM privilege escalation patterns (24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP), and AWS Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated-role attack chain (GetId → GetCredentialsForIdentity → IAM role abuse). Built for the case where recon yields a credential (key, JSON, token) and you need to know what it grants and how to escalate. Use when an AWS key / Azure secret / GCP service account JSON / K8s SA token surfaces from a code repo, JS bundle, APK, breach corpus, or SSRF chain.

DevOps & Infrastructure 3,176 stars 485 forks Updated 4 days ago NOASSERTION

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Quality Score: 86/100

Stars 20%
100
Recency 20%
100
Frontmatter 20%
70
Documentation 15%
100
Issue Health 10%
50
License 10%
100
Description 5%
100

Skill Content

## When to use Trigger when: - A cloud credential surfaces (key, secret, token, JSON file) - SSRF chain reaches IMDS / metadata endpoint - APK / git-leak reveals embedded cloud key - Recon shows public S3/GCS/Azure-blob with permissions you can verify - A Kubernetes API or service-account token is exposed - Post-RCE on a cloud-hosted instance — pivot to cloud control plane Do NOT use for: - On-prem-only environments (use AD attack skills — but those are out of scope per external-only boundary) - Web2 vulns that happen to be on AWS — use the relevant `hunt-*` skill --- ## Credential identification (first 60 seconds) ```bash # AWS access key patterns AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user access key (long-term) ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16} # STS temporary credential AGPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM group AIDA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM user (user-id) AROA[0-9A-Z]{16} # IAM role ANPA[0-9A-Z]{16} # Managed policy # AWS secret pattern (40-char base64-ish — context required) [A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40} # AWS secret access key # Azure AccountKey=[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{86} # Storage account key client_secret pattern + UUID # Azure AD app credential # GCP service account JSON { "type": "service_account", "project_id": "...", "private_key_id": "...", "private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..." } # K8s SA token (JWT format — decode to confirm) eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1... # decode kid claim to see issuer ``` --- ## AWS —...

Details

Author
elementalsouls
Repository
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
Created
2 months ago
Last Updated
4 days ago
Language
Python
License
NOASSERTION

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