environment
SolidExtend this sandbox's own environment (system packages, language toolchains, SDKs — e.g. Rust, Android, JDK, Go, Python) by proposing custom Dockerfile steps the owner approves. Use when a task needs a tool that isn't installed and a runtime install wouldn't survive, or when the user asks to add capabilities to the sandbox itself.
Install
Quality Score: 81/100
Skill Content
Details
- Author
- intentic
- Repository
- intentic/intentic
- Created
- 2 weeks ago
- Last Updated
- today
- Language
- TypeScript
- License
- MIT
Integrates with
Similar Skills
Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category
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