agent-incident-postmortem

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Run a blameless postmortem for an incident caused by an AI agent or LLM feature — hallucinated facts shipped to users, runaway tool use, prompt injection, cost blowouts, or wrong actions taken autonomously. Use when asked to write up an AI incident, analyse why an agent did something wrong, or produce corrective actions after an LLM failure. Produces a structured postmortem with trace reconstruction, a root-cause layer analysis, and corrective actions including a permanent regression case. For non-AI production incidents use incident-postmortem.

AI & Automation 1,356 stars 240 forks Updated yesterday MIT

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Skill Content

# Agent Incident Postmortem Skill AI incidents differ from outages: the system didn't go down — it did something wrong, confidently, and maybe only once. This skill adapts blameless postmortem practice to nondeterministic systems, where "can we reproduce it?" needs traces, not just steps. ## What This Skill Produces - A **blameless postmortem document** with timeline and user/business impact - A **trace reconstruction** of what the agent saw, decided, and did - A **root-cause analysis across the AI failure layers** (not "the model hallucinated" as a conclusion) - **Corrective actions** — always including a new permanent case in the regression suite ## Required Inputs Ask for (if not already provided): - **What the agent did** and what it should have done - **The trace** — the full request: system prompt, context, tool calls and results, output. If no trace exists, that absence is itself a finding - **Blast radius** — how many users/requests, over what window, and whether it's ongoing - **Detection** — how it was noticed (user report? monitor? luck?) and how long after it started ## Root-Cause Layers Walk the layers in order; the root cause is usually the *earliest* layer that could have prevented the outcome. "The model was wrong" is a starting point, never the conclusion — models are known to be fallible, so the question is what let a fallible output become an incident. | Layer | Ask | |---|---| | **Input / context** | Was the context wrong, stale, contradictory, or ...

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Author
mohitagw15856
Repository
mohitagw15856/pm-claude-skills
Created
7 months ago
Last Updated
yesterday
Language
HTML
License
MIT

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