detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs

Featured

Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.

AI & Automation 36,355 stars 4443 forks Updated 2 months ago Apache-2.0

Install

View on GitHub

Quality Score: 94/100

Stars 20%
100
Recency 20%
75
Frontmatter 20%
70
Documentation 15%
100
Issue Health 10%
50
License 10%
100
Description 5%
100

Skill Content

# Detecting Evasion Techniques in Endpoint Logs ## When to Use Use this skill when: - Hunting for adversary defense evasion techniques (MITRE ATT&CK TA0005) in endpoint telemetry - Building detection rules for common evasion methods (process injection, timestomping, log clearing) - Investigating incidents where adversaries disabled or bypassed security tools - Analyzing endpoint logs for indicators of living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse **Do not use** this skill for network-level evasion (use network traffic analysis) or for malware reverse engineering. ## Prerequisites - Sysmon installed and configured with comprehensive logging rules (SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong config) - Windows Security Event Log with advanced audit policy enabled - EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) - SIEM platform for log correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel) - MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix for technique reference ## Workflow ### Step 1: Detect Log Tampering (T1070) **Windows Event Log clearing (T1070.001)**: ``` # Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for wevtutil EventID: 1 CommandLine contains: "wevtutil cl" OR "wevtutil clear-log" # Security Event ID 1102 - Audit log was cleared EventID: 1102 Source: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog # System Event ID 104 - Event log was cleared EventID: 104 # PowerShell log clearing EventID: 1 (Sysmon) CommandLine contains: "Clear-EventLog" OR "Remove-EventLog" # Splunk query: index=windows (EventCode=1102 OR Ev...

Details

Author
mukul975
Repository
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Created
8 months ago
Last Updated
2 months ago
Language
Python
License
Apache-2.0

Bundled in these plugins

Similar Skills

Semantically similar based on skill content — not just same category

AI & Automation Listed

detect-anti-forensics

Detection and hunt methodology for anti-forensic indicator removal on Windows endpoints: audit-log clearing (MITRE ATT&CK T1685.005), timestomping (T1070.006), and file wiping or artifact deletion (T1070.004), the last two under the T1070 Indicator Removal parent, with the adjacent Defense Impairment signal T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log. It keys off Windows Security event 1102, System event 104, Security 1100 and 4719, Sysmon event 2 (file creation time changed) and events 23 and 26 (file delete), plus process-creation and PowerShell logging. The skill gives defenders the real event IDs and fields, a forensic-grade MFT and USN hunt for timestomping, hardening that moves evidence off the host, and links to public SigmaHQ and MITRE rule sources. Use when triaging an Event ID 1102 alert, investigating a cleared Security log, hunting for timestomped files, chasing suspected log tampering or wevtutil cl / Clear-EventLog activity, or hardening log retention so a local wipe does not destroy evidence.

0 Updated 5 days ago
umbrasec-labs
DevOps & Infrastructure Listed

detect-edr-evasion

Detection and hunting methodology for endpoint sensor tampering: AMSI patching (amsi.dll AmsiScanBuffer), ETW blinding (ntdll EtwEventWrite and provider disable), and userland API unhooking that restores a clean ntdll to defeat hooks (MITRE ATT&CK T1685 Disable or Modify Tools, including indicator blocking, with related T1620 Reflective Code Loading and T1055 Process Injection). Keys off Windows endpoint telemetry: Sysmon Image/DLL load (EID 7), ProcessTampering (EID 25), CreateRemoteThread (EID 8), PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104), Defender Operational events, and the suspicious absence of expected ETW providers. Gives a defender view of the signals, a hunt for unhooking and telemetry gaps, and tamper-resistant logging and application-control hardening. Use when triaging a suspected AMSI or ETW bypass, hunting for DLL unhooking or ntdll tampering, investigating why endpoint telemetry went quiet on a host, reviewing EDR tamper-protection alerts, or hardening a fleet against defense impairment.

0 Updated 5 days ago
umbrasec-labs
AI & Automation Featured

detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints

Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely in RAM without writing persistent files to disk, evading traditional antivirus. Use when building detections for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, WMI persistence, and registry-resident malware. Activates for requests involving fileless malware detection, in-memory attacks, PowerShell exploitation, or living-off-the-land techniques.

36,355 Updated 2 months ago
mukul975