implementing-sigstore-for-software-signing

# Implementing Sigstore for Software Signing ## When to Use - Signing container images and software artifacts without managing long-lived cryptographic keys - Establishing verifiable provenance for build outputs in CI/CD pipelines using OIDC identity binding - Querying the Rekor transparency log to audit when and by whom an artifact was signed - Verifying that container images pulled from registries were signed by authorized identities and issuers - Integrating Sigstore verification into Kubernetes admission controllers to enforce signed-image policies **Do not use** for signing artifacts that require air-gapped or offline signing workflows where OIDC authentication is unavailable, for environments that cannot reach the public Sigstore infrastructure (Fulcio, Rekor) and have no private instance deployed, or as a replacement for traditional PGP/GPG signing where regulatory compliance mandates specific key management procedures. ## Prerequisites - Cosign CLI v2.4+ installed (`go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest` or binary release) - Access to an OIDC identity provider supported by Fulcio (Google, GitHub, Microsoft, or a custom OIDC issuer) - Container registry credentials (for signing container images) with push access to store signature objects - Python 3.9+ with `sigstore`, `requests`, and `cryptography` packages for the automation agent - Network access to `fulcio.sigstore.dev`, `rekor.sigstore.dev`, and `tuf-repo-cdn.sigstore.dev` (or private Sig...