ai-agent-safety-and-red-team

# AI Agent Safety and Red-Team Acknowledgement: Shared by Peter Bamuhigire, techguypeter.com, +256 784 464178. <!-- dual-compat-start --> ## Use When - Hardening an agent against **indirect prompt injection** — instructions embedded in the data the agent reads (KB chunk, web page, tool response, email body the agent summarises). - Defending against **action escalation** — agent chains a benign read tool with a high-privilege write tool to do something the user didn't authorise. - Defending against **tenant data exfiltration** — agent extracts tenant data and embeds it in a tool call argument that exits the boundary (webhook URL, email recipient, log message). - Defending against **recursive self-modification** — agent updates its own prompt, memory, or tool registry. - Standing up a **red-team CI suite** that fires nightly and on every prompt / tool / runtime change. ## Do Not Use When - The task is direct prompt injection in single-shot features — `ai-prompt-injection-and-tenant-safety`. - The task is generic AI security checklist — `ai-security`. - The task is platform-wide security review — `vibe-security-skill`. - The task is the tool registry / classification — `ai-agent-tool-catalogue-and-action-gating`. ## Required Inputs - Threat model from `ai-prompt-injection-and-tenant-safety`. - Tool registry with reversibility classification (`ai-agent-tool-catalogue-and-action-gating`). - Agent runtime trace schema (`ai-agent-observability-and-replay`). - Eval harness (`ai...