detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials

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Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.

DevOps & Infrastructure 36,355 stars 4443 forks Updated 2 months ago Apache-2.0

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Skill Content

# Detecting Compromised Cloud Credentials ## When to Use - When investigating alerts about unusual cloud API activity from unfamiliar locations - When building detection rules for credential theft and abuse across cloud environments - When responding to notifications from cloud providers about exposed credentials - When monitoring for credential stuffing or brute force attacks against cloud identities - When assessing the scope of a credential compromise after initial detection **Do not use** for preventing credential compromise (use MFA, credential rotation, and secrets management), for detecting application-level credential theft (use application security monitoring), or for endpoint credential harvesting detection (use EDR tools). ## Prerequisites - AWS GuardDuty enabled across all accounts and regions - Azure Defender for Identity and Entra ID Protection configured - GCP Security Command Center with Event Threat Detection enabled - CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log, and GCP Audit Log centralized for analysis - SIEM integration for cross-cloud correlation of credential abuse indicators - Threat intelligence feeds for known malicious IP ranges ## Workflow ### Step 1: Detect Credential Compromise Indicators in AWS Monitor GuardDuty findings and CloudTrail anomalies that indicate credential abuse. ```bash # List GuardDuty credential-related findings aws guardduty list-findings \ --detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \ -...

Details

Author
mukul975
Repository
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Created
8 months ago
Last Updated
2 months ago
Language
Python
License
Apache-2.0

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